Evaluating National Football League Draft Choices: The Passing Game by Bryan L. Boulier et al.
Research Program on Forecasting (RPF) Working Papers represent preliminary work circulated for 
comment and discussion.  Please contact the author(s) before citing this paper in any publications.  The 
views expressed in RPF Working Papers are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 





Evaluating National Football League Draft Choices: 
The Passing Game 
 
 
Bryan L. Boulier, Professor of Economics 
H.O. Stekler, Research Professor of Economics 
Jason Coburn, Student 
Timothy Rankins, Student 
Department of Economics 
The George Washington University 










July 22, 2009 
 
 
FORTHCOMING IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE ON SPORTS FORECASTING OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING 
 
 
RESEARCH PROGRAM ON FORECASTING 
Center of Economic Research  
Department of Economics 
The George Washington University 




 Research Program on Forecasting (RPF) Working Papers represent preliminary work circulated for comment and 
discussion.  Please contact the author(s) before citing this paper in any publications.  The views expressed in RPF 
Working Papers are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of RPF or George 







Evaluating National Football League Draft Choices: 











Key words: sports economics, sports forecasts, National Football League, personnel forecasts. 
 
 
Bryan L. Boulier, Professor of Economics 
H.O. Stekler, Research Professor of Economics   
Jason Coburn, Student 
Timothy Rankins, Student 
Department of Economics 
The George Washington University 
Washington, DC 20052 
 
July 22, 2009 
 
Corresponding author: Bryan L. Boulier 
Telephone: 202-994-8088 
e-mail: mortile@gwu.edu 
Fax:  202-994-6147 
 
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Robert Goldfarb, Donald Parsons, David Ribar, 
Anthony Yezer, and participants in a seminar at the University of Maryland in Baltimore County 
for helpful comments. Research Program on Forecasting (RPF) Working Papers represent preliminary work circulated for comment and 
discussion.  Please contact the author(s) before citing this paper in any publications.  The views expressed in RPF 
Working Papers are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of RPF or George 
Washington University.   
 
 
 Evaluating National Football League Draft Choices: 







  Abstract 
 
 
Recruiting competent personnel is crucial for the success of any organization, especially in 
competitive sports where the success of teams depends upon the quality of players selected.  This 
paper examines whether football executives are able to forecast who will be the most successful 
quarterbacks and wide receivers.  Our data base is constructed from the NFL drafts between 
1974 and 2005. We use a variety of measures to determine the success of the players selected in 
those drafts.  We conclude that, although their ability to rank the future performance of players is 
less than perfect, football executives are very successful in evaluating the talent of athletes.  
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“Without question, one of the primary factors affecting success in the National Football League 
is having talented players...[T]he most important step in securing the players a team needs is 
evaluating the available talent pool...” 
            Bill Walsh (Walsh, et al., 1997, p. 113) 
 
1.  Introduction      
  Forecasting how personnel will perform is important to all organizations.  It is especially 
so in professional sports where a team’s success depends on the talents of its players.  The 
opening quote by Bill Walsh, a coach and later executive for the San Francisco 49ers, 
underscores this point.  In this paper, we examine whether football executives have the ability to 
forecast who will have a successful career in the NFL.   Our analysis focuses on one component 
of a professional football team’s performance- the offensive passing game involving 
quarterbacks and wide receivers.  This is, obviously, an important aspect of a NFL team’s overall 
performance.  Moreover, there are anecdotal statements that question whether NFL executives 
have the ability to evaluate the intrinsic talent of quarterbacks and wide receivers when they 
enter the NFL draft.  Commentators note that Joe Montana was drafted only in the third round in 
1979, later than three other quarterbacks, each of whom had less successful careers than he did.  
Other quarterbacks (such as Warren Moon and David Krieg) had very successful careers in the 
NFL but were not even selected in the draft.  As for wide receivers, Jerry Rice, considered the 
best who ever played, was the third wide receiver chosen in 1985.  Terrell Owens, who ranks 
fifth in all-time receiving yardage, was only drafted in the third round after 11 wide receivers had 
already been selected. 
  Numerous management and labor issues have been covered in the literature on 
professional football.  These include principal-agent problems (Atkinson, et al., 1988),   2
compensation systems (Bishop, et al., 1990), union member behavior (Gramm., et al., 1994), 
managerial efficiency and tenure (Scully, 1994), and contract negotiation strategies (Conlin, 
2002).   Hendricks, et al. (2003) use NFL draft information to test hypotheses regarding 
uncertainty and hiring processes.  Massey and Thaler (2005) conclude that the NFL draft choices 
are economically inefficient, in that managers overvalue early draft choices relative to later draft 
choices.  The economic surplus of draft choices, measured as the difference between projected 
economic value of players and their compensation costs, is maximized in the second round of the 
draft.   
  Hendricks, et al., and Massey and Thaler examine players drafted for all positions taken 
together.  The work most closely related to ours is that of Berri and Simmons (2008) for 
quarterbacks and Johnson and Rafferty (2008) for wide receivers.    Much of the Berri and 
Simmons analysis uses data on quarterbacks' performances during seasons in which they have at 
least 100 plays.  Holding constant years of experience, they find little correlation between 
performance measures and draft rank in these data (cf., Table 3 and Table 6).   They conclude 
that associations between draft rank and aggregate performance such as total number of games 
played or number of passes must be explained by the fact that quarterbacks who are drafted 
earlier have more plays (p. 13).  They also find that physical characteristics of a player (such as 
his body mass index, height, and time in the 40 yard dash) and his intelligence score (as 
measured by the Wonderlic test) predict draft rank, but are not as good at predicting professional 
performance in their first four years of professional play as variables summarizing a player's 
college performance.    Johnson and Rafferty examine the first five years of careers of wide 
receivers drafted from 1988 to 2003.  They find that draft rank and scouts' ratings published in   3
Professional Football Weekly both play a role in forecasting players' performances, but that, 
controlling for these variables, a player's physical characteristics are generally statistically 
insignificantly related to performance.  An exception is that a wide receiver's body mass index is 
positively related to the probability that he will be selected for the Pro Bowl.   
  In this paper, we use data on quarterbacks and wide receivers drafted by the NFL 
between 1974 and 2005.  In contrast to the papers by Berri and Simmons for quarterbacks and 
Johnson and Rafferty for wide receivers, we focus on the career performance of players.  In 
choosing draft picks,  a manager is interested not only in average performance per play or per 
season but also the number of seasons the individual will play for the team or his later value to a 
team to which he might be traded.  Moreover, quarterbacks who had a least 100 plays per season 
or wide receivers who lasted at least five years in the NFL are (almost) by definition successful 
players.   Life tables based on our data indicate that only 19% of wide receivers and only 24% of 
quarterbacks drafted in the third round or later play at least five years.  Part of the forecasting 
skill of a manager is to identify those players who will (or who will not) fall in these successful 
groups. 
  We first describe the draft system and then our data set and measures of performance.  
The next two sections present our methods of analysis and summarize our empirical findings 
with regard to associations between draft rank and performance.  We then examine the frequency 
with which football executives (1) fail to draft players who turn out to be successful or (2) use 
early round picks for players who turn out to be unsuccessful.  We also explore whether some 
teams are more successful at drafting than other teams. The last section presents our conclusions.  
   4
2.  The draft:  the talent pool  
  The draft is a method of allocating individuals who have not previously played in the 
NFL to the teams in the league.  The new players are, almost without exception, men who have 
played football in college.  Players who are “drafted” may only play for the team that has 
selected them unless the selecting team relinquishes or trades their rights to the player.  If a 
particular player is overlooked in the draft and is not selected by any team, that individual is 
considered a free agent and can negotiate with, and play for, any team in the league. 
  Teams select their future players in a predetermined order based on the previous year’s 
performances.  The team with the worst record in the previous year makes the first selection, 
followed by teams in ascending order of their previous year’s record.  After the team with the 
best record has chosen its player, the first round of the draft is completed.  This process is 
repeated through the n rounds of each year’s draft.  While teams are free to choose players at 
any position, it is presumed that players who are chosen earlier have more potential than players 
who perform at the same position but are chosen in the later rounds of the draft.   
  There are numerous sources of information for assessing the talent of players.  Scouts 
watch college football games or study films of the games, college coaches provide assessments, 
and team combines administer physical and mental tests to invited athletes and provide 
opportunities for personal interviews.  Finally, the most talented athletes are “worked out” by 
NFL coaches on their own college campuses.  If the executives can use this information to 
evaluate players’ abilities and forecast their future success, there should be a relationship 
between the order in which players are chosen in the draft and their subsequent performance in 
the NFL.  Those chosen earlier in each year’s draft should outperform those taken later in the   5
same draft.   
  It is not possible, however, to evaluate the executives’ judgments or forecasts by simply 
comparing a player’s position in the draft with some measure of his subsequent performance.  
The reason is that the selectees play different positions.  In order to obtain meaningful results, 
one must compare drafted selectees who play the same position. Since we are concerned with the 
offensive passing game, we do not evaluate the entire draft but concentrate on individuals who 
play two skill positions: quarterback and wide receiver.  Because there are widely accepted 
measures of performance for those positions, we can determine whether there is a relationship 
between the order that players are selected and their subsequent performance. 
3.  Data and performance measures  
3.1 Data 
  The source for our data is an online site: Pro-football-references.com. This reference 
includes comprehensive statistics on the performance of every player who has ever been 
involved in an NFL game through 2008. It also provides complete information about each year’s 
draft, i.e. the round in which a player was chosen as well as the sequence in which players were 
taken. Our analysis is based on the drafts from 1974 through 2005.   Although the web site 
includes data for the 2006-2008 drafts, those data are not included because there is insufficient 
information about these players to analyze their lifetime performance.  By ending with the 2005 
draft, at least four years’ performance data on each player are available.   
  Over this period, the number of rounds in the draft was not constant.  In 1974-76, there 
were 17 rounds; this was reduced to 12 rounds from 1977 to 1992, 8 rounds in 1993, and only 7 
rounds in subsequent years.  In addition, the number of teams increased from 26 in 1974 to 32 in   6
2005, so that the number of players selected per round also changed.  In order to provide a 
comparable set of data over time, we group players by the number at which they were selected. 
All players selected as one of the top thirty players in a draft year are designated Round 1.  
Players who were the 31
st through 60
th selections in each draft were grouped together and are 
referred to as Round 2 picks.  This process of creating groups continued until the 210
th position 
was reached.  All players selected later than 210 were grouped together and designated as Round 
8.
1   In the remainder of this paper, the word “round “will refer to these groupings. 
Except for the actual number of rounds, the structure of the draft has not changed over 
the period that we are examining. Nevertheless, there have been changes in the way the NFL is 
organized and the league’s relationship with its players. The most important involve the 
beginning of free agency in 1993 and the introduction of the salary cap in 1994.  These changes 
do not have a material effect on the order of the draft. They should also not affect any of the 
performance measures because the minimum league salary of a veteran player who goes to a new 
team has virtually no impact on the team’s salary cap. 
3.2 Performance measures 
  Quarterbacks 
  We use three indicators to measure a quarterback’s performance: (1) the number of years 
played,  (2) the number of passes thrown, and (3) the quarterback rating.  The length of a 
quarterback’s career measures how long coaches thought that he had the ability to perform in the 
                                                 
1 What we have called Round 8 differs from conventional usage because our Round 8 
encompasses players taken from the eighth round in one particular year to as high as the 17
th 
draft round in some other years.    7
NFL.
2  It also reflects his durability.  This measure has the advantage that it is independent of the 
talent of players surrounding the quarterback and of the offensive style of his team.   For 
example, a quarterback on a run-oriented team will throw fewer passes than if he plays for a 
team without a good running back.   
We examined two measures of years played. The first counts the number of years that the 
quarterback actually participated in a team’s offense and threw one or more passes. The second 
counts all of the years that the player was in the league - from the date of the draft to the player’s 
last appearance. The second includes time preparing to be successful while on a team’s  taxi 
squad, years spent on injured reserve whether actually injured or not, and years that he was a 
backup quarterback at the end of a career but did not appear in a game.  Our results are not 
sensitive to the choice of measure.  Consequently, we only present results for the first measure in 
this paper.   Tables for the other measure are available on request.   
The number of passes thrown measures the contribution a quarterback makes for the team 
and distinguishes between quarterbacks who are starters from those who back-ups.
3  Finally, the 
quarterback rating (QR) was devised by a special study committee of the NFL in the 1970s and 
has been used to assess the performance of passers since then.  The QR is positively related to 
the number of completions, yards gained per attempt, and touchdowns per attempt and inversely 
related to the number of interceptions per attempt (Carroll, 1986).  We have set the QR equal to 
zero for quarterbacks who threw no passes.  Because the QR is a measure of the efficiency of a 
                                                 
2Years played is one of the measures of a player’s success used by Hendricks, et al. 
(2003). 
3Passing yards is another potential measure.  We found that the correlation between the 
number of passes thrown and passing yards was .998. We, therefore, only present our results for   8
quarterback’s passes, it is possible for the QR to be high and the number of passes thrown to be 
low.
4    
  Wide receivers 
  For wide receivers, we measure performance by (1) the number of years in the league and 
(2) total yards of receptions.  We examined two measures of years played:  (1) the number in 
which he was an active receiver and (2) the number he was in the league. The first measures the 
receiver’s ability to perform at high levels over a long period of time as a starter. The second also 
includes years spent as a backup third or fourth receiver or as a return specialist on special teams.   
As in the quarterback analysis, we report results only for the first measure in this paper, since the 
results are very similar for both measures.  Total yards of reception reflects the offensive 
contribution of a wide receiver to the team(s) for which he plays and distinguishes players who 
are starters from those who are back-ups.  
4.  Methodology for evaluating performance and draft position 
  We use a number of different approaches for evaluating the relationship between the draft 
position of a player and his subsequent performance. The comparisons are done separately for 
quarterbacks and wide receivers. 
4.1 Individual draft years 
  We first focus on each draft year (1974-2005) and examine the relation between draft 
position of an individual quarterback (wide receiver) relative to other quarterbacks (wide 
                                                                                                                                                             
number of passes. 
4Six quarterbacks, only one of whom had more than 30 passes, had quarterback ratings 
exceeding that of Peyton Manning (QR = 94.7), who had the highest QR among players with 
more than 50 passes.   9
receivers) and their subsequent performances.  
The hypothesis is that there is a relationship between:  (1) the order in which a player  
was drafted relative to others at the same position and (2) their relative success.  The Spearman 
rank order correlation coefficient is used to test this hypothesis.  If football executives were able 
to forecast relative future success, then players selected earlier should have been the most 
successful, and the Spearman coefficient should be negative and significant.  If the Spearman 
coefficient is negative and significant we are implicitly rejecting the hypothesis that the ability of 
the executives is inferior to randomly selecting the quarterbacks and wide receivers.  At a 
minimum, the executives’ performance should exceed this benchmark or standard of 
comparison.  It would have been preferable to compare the executives’ performance with that of 
knowledgeable sports analysts. However, such a data base was not available.   
4.2 Pooling across all draft years 
  In using the Spearman Rank correlation for each individual year, we are evaluating 
executives’ abilities to choose among those who were available in that particular draft for a 
particular position.  In arranging players only by the order of their selection, we are ignoring the 
overall position of the player chosen. Two quarterbacks ranked as the number 1 and 2 overall 
choices in a specific draft - not just among quarterbacks - would receive the same order as the 
first two quarterbacks who were the 50th and 55
th overall selectees.  However, players who are 
chosen earlier are considered to have more potential than those chosen later. If executives choose 
wisely, then one would expect that players chosen in the early rounds of the draft would be more 
likely to perform at higher levels than those selected in the later rounds.   
  To examine this hypothesis, we pooled the data from all the draft years.  Although the use   10
of pooled data permits us to compare performance measures across draft rounds, there is a 
complication: not all players had completed their careers by 2008.   Of the players in the sample, 
12% of the quarterbacks and 10% of the wide receivers were still active in 2008.  The percentage 
of players still active is correlated with the round in which they were drafted.  Among 
quarterbacks, 25% of first round choices (i.e., those chosen as picks 1-30) were still playing 
compared to only 4% of eighth round picks (i.e., those taken later than 210).
5  As a result, a 
simple comparison of (say) average years played by round picked would yield biased results by 
understating the performance difference.  Since few quarterbacks drafted in the eighth round 
were still playing in 2008, for this group a simple average of the number of years played 
approximates completed career length.  However, since more than 25% of first round 
quarterbacks were still active in 2008,  the actual average number of years played by this group 
as of 2008 is an underestimate of the number of years that they will have played on average over 
the length of their entire careers.  More formally, the sample is censored.  We adopt two 
statistical methods that appropriately control for this censoring: life tables and a regression 
analysis that controls for censoring. 
  To analyze the number of years played, we constructed life tables by round that show the 
probability that a player taken in that round survives to play at least T years (ST).   The life tables 
are based on the Kaplan-Meier (or product limit) methodology (Kaplan and Meier, 1959; Cleves, 
et al., 2001, pp. 88-92).   Players’ careers contribute to the calculation of survival probabilities 
until the time at which they are censored.  An illustration of the Kaplan-Meier technique is 
                                                 
5Among wide receivers, 24% of first round pick and only 1% of eighth round picks were 
still active in 2008.   11
described in Appendix A. 
  We also regressed performance measures on the actual rank at which a player was 
drafted.
6   Because players taken in earlier draft rounds are more likely to be censored, ordinary 
least squares estimates yield biased estimates of the coefficients.  We, therefore, estimated the 
relationships using censored normal regression (Greene, 1990, pp. 727-739; Stata Reference 
Manual, 2001, pp. 174-188).   In addition, because simple functions of performance and position 
did not seem to capture adequately the relationship between these variables, we estimated 
regressions in which performance was related to a piecewise linear function (spline) of the actual 
draft rank at which a player was selected.  The knots of the spline correspond to the endpoints of 
ranks used to define the rounds (e.g., the first linear segment corresponds to ranks 1-30), used in 
the life tables.  We also added a knot at 290, corresponding to the approximate median of 
position of players drafted later than 210. 
5. Results 
5.1 Performance and draft rank by draft year 
 Quarterbacks 
  The distribution of the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between performance 
measures and draft order for quarterbacks and their statistical significance levels are presented in 
Table 1.  With two exceptions, there is a negative relationship between the order in which 
players were selected and their subsequent performance. When the quarterback rating is used as 
                                                 
6 In the later years covered by this study, there have been 32 teams and 32 draft choices 
per draft. Using our convention, a player selected in the number 31 or 32 position of the first 
actual draft round would be placed in our Round 2.  Conversely when there were (say) only 26 
teams, a player selected 27 in the actual second round would be classified as a Round 1 choice   12
the measure of performance, the null that there is no correlation between the two orderings is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance for 15 of the 32 drafts.  When either of the other two 
statistics is used as the performance measure for quarterbacks, the null is rejected a much larger 
proportion of the time:  24 out of 32 drafts for years played and 22 out of 32 drafts for number of 
passes thrown.   
  There is an explanation for the finding that the Spearman coefficients based on the QR 
are on average lower than for the other quarterback measures and reject the null the fewest 
number of times.  In some years, there were a number of quarterbacks chosen very late in the 
draft who had relatively high QRs but who threw very few passes over their careers and stayed in 
the league for only a small number of years.
7  When this occurred, the value of the Spearman 
statistic based on the QR measure was reduced relative to the same statistic based on the other 
performance measures. 
  Finally, we examined whether there are trends in the association between draft order and 
performance by regressing the Spearman coefficients for each measure on time.  There were no 
statistically significant coefficients of the time variable, indicating that ability to identify “good” 
players and forecast their success has not changed over time. 
  Wide Receivers 
  Spearman rank correlation coefficients for wide receivers for the two measures of 
success, years played and reception yards, are negative and statistically significantly different 
                                                                                                                                                             
using our definitions. 
7 For example, Kerwin Bell was drafted in the 180
th position in 1988.  He played one year 
and threw five passes.  His quarterback rating of 158.3 was 35 points higher than the second 
highest QR in our entire sample.   13
from zero at the 5% level for all years.   We regressed the Spearman coefficients for each 
measure on time.  The coefficient of time was negative and significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level in the yards equation.  However, this result is driven by an outlier, a Spearman 
coefficient of -.32 in 1985.   If this observation is removed, then there is no evidence that the 
magnitudes of the Spearman coefficients have changed over time. 
   Overall, the magnitudes of the Spearman correlation coefficients and their levels of 
statistical significance suggest that executives can effectively forecast both the future 
performance of quarterbacks relative to each other and of wide receivers relative to each other 
in a given year’s cohort of players.
8 Their ability to do so is, however, less than perfect. 
 
5.2 Do players taken in earlier rounds have greater success?  Pooled data. 
 
Quarterbacks: years played 
 
   We first examine life tables of quarterback careers by the round in which they were 
drafted and then we present the results of the censored regression showing the relation between 
years played and the rank at which the player was selected. 
  Table 2A contains the life tables showing the relationship between the round in which a 
quarterback is drafted and the probability that he will still be playing T years after he was 
drafted.    The results indicate that, in general, the proportion of quarterbacks surviving to play 
any given number of years is higher the earlier the round in which the quarterback is drafted.
9  
The differences in survival probabilities are quite large.  For example, among quarterbacks taken 
                                                 
8This result is consistent with Spurr’s (2000) finding with respect to the baseball draft: 
the earlier a player is selected in the draft, the more likely he is to reach the major leagues.   
9 Logrank and Wilcoxon tests reject the hypothesis that survival functions are equal   14
in Round 1, 56% play 9 or more years, while in Round 2 only 47% have careers of this length.  
Less than 32% of those taken in Round 8 play at least one year. Seventeen of the 61 players 
taken in Round 1 played more than 13 years; only five among the 285 players taken after Round 
2 had careers of this length.  
  Staw and Hoang (1995) find evidence that the playing time of NBA players who are 
drafted highly exceeds that justified by their performance.  They suggest that this finding is 
explained by managers' unwillingness to admit draft “mistakes”.  That is, failure of a highly 
ranked pick to play is evidence of incompetent management.  In the NFL collective bargaining 
agreement, players taken in the first 16 picks can sign an initial contract for a maximum of six 
years, those taken in picks 17 through 32 have a five year contract maximum, and those chosen 
after the first round sign contracts for three years.  Presumably the incentive for managers to play 
draftees is higher in the early years of their careers, when their failure to play is more apparent to 
fans.  When initial contracts have expired, the incentive to retain players to justify their “high” 
draft status is less pressing.   
The life tables indicate that quarterbacks taken in the first round have substantially higher 
probabilities of playing until year 7 than those taken in (say) round 2  - .64 vs. .44.  For those 
taken later than the first round, probabilities of surviving to year four decline monotonically with 
increases in the round at which a player is drafted.  Since teams' initial contracts for these 
quarterbacks have expired by these dates, the fact that players drafted in earlier rounds continue 
to play is evidence that the underlying abilities of those taken in earlier rounds exceeds those 
                                                                                                                                                             
across rounds at the 1% level.   15
taken in later rounds.
10 
  Table 3 (Column 1) presents the results of the censored regressions in which the number 
of years played is related to the splines of draft rank.    The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that players taken later in the draft (within and across rounds) have shorter careers.  
This hypothesis implies that the coefficients should be negative and, in fact, eight of the nine 
coefficients of the linear segments are negative.  Figure 1 (a) displays the predicted values of the 
regression.  Predicted years played drops sharply in the first round.  A quarterback chosen first in 
the draft would play on average 9.5 years compared to only 7.3 years for one chosen at the top of 
the second round (i.e., 31
st in the draft). 
Quarterbacks: other performance measures  
  Column 2 of Table 3 reports the censored regressions of the quarterback rating on the 
splines of ranks at which players were drafted.  Column 3 reports a similar regression for passing 
attempts.  Predicted values from the regressions are shown in Figure 1 (b,c).  The results indicate 
that the earlier a quarterback is drafted, the better is his performance and that there is a sharp 
drop from the first to the second round.  Quarterbacks chosen first in the draft have ratings nearly 
15 points higher and throw over 780 more passes than those taken 31
st    The number of passes 
thrown also declines markedly from the top of the second round to the top of the third round, 
although the quarterback rating for a quarterback taken 31
st is only slightly below that of one 
drafted 61
st. 
Wide receivers: years played 
  The life tables for wide receivers (Table 3) yield results that are even stronger than those 
                                                 
10A similar observation applies to wide receivers.  See Table 3.   16
obtained for the quarterbacks.
11   More than 90% of first round picks play at least four years, and 
over half play at least eight years.  Only about 70% of second round picks play four or more 
years, and slightly less than 40% play at least eight years.   Less than one-quarter of round 8 
picks play even two years.  
  Turning to the censored regressions relating the number of years played to the splines of 
the draft rank (Table 3, Column 4), we note that the results are similar to those obtained for the 
quarterbacks.  Predicted values are shown in Figure 2(a).  A wide receiver taken as number one 
is expected to play nearly ten years, while one taken at the top of the second round is expected to 
play only seven years and one taken at the top of the third round slightly more than five years. 
   Wide receivers: pass reception yards 
  Table 3 Column 5 presents the censored regression of pass reception yards, with the 
predicted values shown in Figure 2(b).  Eight of the nine coefficients of the splines of ranks are 
negative and pass receptions decline sharply with draft rank in the first and second rounds.  A 
number one draft pick can be expected to have 7,100 receiving yards compared to only 3,800 
yards for one taken at the top of the second round and only 2,100 yards for one taken at the top 
of the third round.   
 Summary of findings 
  In sum, the evidence for both quarterbacks and wide receivers indicates that players 
taken  in earlier rounds have longer careers, with those taken in the first round and second 
rounds being much more successful as measured by all of the criteria that we have selected to 
                                                 
11 Logrank and Wilcoxon tests reject the hypothesis that survival functions are equal across 
rounds at the 1% level.   17
represent performance.  This suggests that football executives are very successful in evaluating 
the talent of athletes and predicting how they will perform. 
6. How often do football executives make errors? 
  The preceding empirical results indicate that, on average, players taken early in the draft 
have measurably better performance than those taken later in the draft.  Nonetheless, the 
Spearman rank order correlations between draft position and subsequent performance among 
players taken in a given year are all less than one.  Moreover, the fairly low pseudo-R
2s in the 
regression analyses suggest that much of the variation in player performance is not explained by 
draft rank. In short, while executives pick well on average, they also make errors.  Errors can be 
viewed either as failing to draft a high quality player early or using an early draft pick to pick a 
player who turns out not to be successful.   Before looking at these errors in the next two 
sections, we need to point some potential shortcomings of our measures.  First, we can only 
identify “ex post” errors.  At the time teams were drafting players, a quarterback (or receiver) 
may have seemed very talented.  However, an injury may have cut short a promising career.  If 
the injury was unpredictable, then we will be falsely counting this choice as an error.  Second, 
players’ performances will be affected by the characteristics of their teammates and the system 
within which they play.  A high ranked receiver will accumulate fewer yards on a team with a 
poor quarterback and a coach who stresses the running game.  As in the previous example, this 
will yield an upward bias to our estimates of draft choice errors.   
6.1 Top players who are overlooked 
  The first type of error is exemplified by players who have extraordinarily successful 
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careers but were not drafted as high picks or even drafted at all.  A prescient executive should 
have picked such players earlier. To investigate the frequency with which top players were 
overlooked in the draft, we performed two types of analyses.  The first analysis examined 
whether there were any players whose subsequent performance was better than those taken in the 
first two rounds of a given year.  The second analysis examined the frequency with which the 
very best players at each of the two positions were overlooked. 
  Cohort comparison 
  To determine how many players in a given year were drafted too low, we first examined 
the records of those drafted in the first two rounds.  We then determined whether there were 
other players who were drafted in the same year and had superior records to those taken in the 
first two rounds.  For quarterbacks, we used the number of passes thrown as our index of 
“quality”.   As an example, in 1986 there were three quarterbacks drafted in the first two rounds; 
two of the other 13 quarterbacks drafted threw more passes than two of the three taken in Rounds 
1 and 2.   Thus, we would count two errors in that draft year. 
  From 1974 to 2005, there were 95 quarterbacks who were taken in the first two rounds, 
and there were 38 quarterbacks taken in later rounds, who outperformed their first two round 
cohorts, yielding an error rate of 40%. The results for wide receivers were similar.  There were 
216 wide receivers drafted in the first two rounds and 91 of those drafted in later rounds in the 
same year had superior performance as measured by receiving yards, yielding an error rate of 
42%. 
  It should be noted that this criterion has some weaknesses in identifying draft errors.  
First, the number of identifiable potential mistakes is constrained by the number of players taken   19
in Rounds 1 and 2.  For example in 1988, no quarterbacks were drafted in these rounds, so that 
the criterion leaves no room for errors in this year.  Second, not all of the errors identified with 
this procedure are serious.  It may be that the performance of the overlooked player is close to 
that of a player mistakenly picked in the first two rounds.  In addition, not all overlooked players 
had careers that were much more successful than those of players chosen earlier.  For this reason, 
we also examined the best performers at each position. 
  Best performers 
To obtain the frequency of serious errors that were made in the drafting process, we 
looked at the records of the top quarterbacks and wide receivers selected during our sample 
period.  One measure of success is longevity in the NFL.  We, therefore, examined the 
performance of the 65 quarterbacks and 121 wide receivers who played at least ten years.  In 
order to undertake this analysis, we only use data from the 1974-1999 draft, since players taken 
after 1999 could not have played 10 years given that our sample ends with the 2008 season. 
  The second measure of success is based on the performance records of the top 50 players 
at each position as ranked by the number of passes thrown by quarterbacks and the reception 
yards for wide receivers.  Each of the top 50 quarterbacks threw at least 2,516 passes and each of 
the top wide receivers had at least 8,129 reception yards.
12  The entire sample period can be used 
for this analysis.   
  Table 4 presents the percentage distribution by round of all quarterbacks (and wide 
receivers) drafted and the percentage distributions among the best performers.  The table 
                                                 
12 The top 50 passers were drafted in the years 1974-2002, while the top 50 wide 
receivers were drafted from 1974 to 2001.   20
indicates that top performers are disproportionately represented in the first two rounds of the 
draft.  Only 19% of all quarterbacks who were drafted were chosen in those two rounds. 
However, 49% of the quarterbacks who played ten or more years and 60% of the top 50 passers 
were selected in these rounds.     
  Still, a considerable number of the best performers were selected in later rounds.  Failing 
to pick a player who turns out to be successful is analogous to a Type II error in the statistical 
literature (i.e., accepting the null hypothesis when the alternative is true).  In order to assess the 
Type II error rate of the NFL executives, it is necessary to adjust these figures for the number of 
quarterbacks drafted in later rounds.  There were 391 quarterbacks drafted between 1974 and 
1999 who could have played ten or more years, with 75 drafted in the first two rounds and 316 in 
the later rounds.  There were 33 later round picks among the 65 who played ten or more years.  
Thus the executives had an error rate of about 10% (= 100% x 33/316) of failing to recognize a 
quarterback who would be successful as measured by the number of years played.  The error rate 
is smaller if one examines the top 50 passers.  Of the players drafted in later rounds, 16 threw 
enough passes to qualify among top 50 passers, an error rate of 5%.  In addition, there were also 
four quarterbacks who were not drafted at all, but who would have qualified in the top 50.
13  
Adding these four to the sample yields an error rate of 6%.   
Similar results are observed for wide receivers.  While about 17% of all wide receivers 
were taken in the first two rounds, half of those who played 10 or more years and nearly 70% of 
those among the top 50 in reception yards were taken in these rounds.  The type II error rates for 
                                                 
13 These undrafted quarterbacks and their number of passes thrown in parentheses were: 
Warren Moon (6,786), Dave Krieg (5,311), Jim Zorn (3,149), and Bobby Hebert (3,121).   21
wide receivers are lower than for quarterbacks.   Of the 839 wide receivers drafted later than the 
second round from 1974 to 1999, only 48 had careers that last more than nine years, an error rate 
of 6%.  Of wide receivers drafted later than the second round from 1974 to 2001, only 1.6% were 
among the top 50 in terms of yards of reception.  One top wide receiver, Rod Smith with 11,389 
yards, was undrafted.  When he is included, the error rate is 1.8%. 
One way to view these results is that executives make a substantial number of errors.  
That is, every team had two chances to draft players who would eventually be among the best 
performers in the NFL and did not take them.  The other way to interpret these results is that 
most teams made unpublished forecasts that particular athletes did not have the potential to 
perform well in the NFL and consequently were not willing to take the risk of using an early 
draft round pick to choose them. If these draft intentions became public knowledge, a team with 
superior or inside information could afford to wait until the third or later rounds to take the “risk” 
of drafting this individual.  This could be a possible explanation for the success of players who 
were chosen in the later rounds of the draft.  It does not explain why a small number of very 
successful players were never chosen.  However, it must be remembered that there were only 
four highly successful quarterbacks and one wide receiver who were not drafted at all.   
6.2 Top draft choices who were unsuccessful 
  The figures given in the previous section for overlooked players also help identify 
choices that were unsuccessful. Of the 95 quarterbacks taken in the first two rounds, 38 threw 
fewer passes than the number thrown by those taken in subsequent rounds in the same year, and 
91 of the wide receivers among the 216 taken in the first two rounds had fewer reception yards 
than others taken in the same year.   Of course, this measure would identify a team needing a   22
quarterback taking Steve Bartkowski (3456 passes) in the first round of 1975 as a mistake 
because he threw fewer passes than Steve Grogan (Round 4, 3593 passes). 
  To get at serious errors, we looked at the percentage distributions by round of players 
who did not play or played fewer than three years.  These figures are shown in Table 4.  Relative 
to the percentage distribution of all quarterbacks or wide receivers drafted, those taken in Rounds 
1 through Round 5 are underrepresented among those who played fewer than three years.  A 
player taken in the first two rounds who does not play at all or who plays less than three years is 
a serious mistake in the sense that this was a wasted draft choice.   Among quarterbacks drafted 
in the first two rounds, only four did not play at all and only 8 of 94 (8.5%) played fewer than 
three years.   Only five first or second round wide receivers did not play at all, and only 29 of 
222 (13.1%) played fewer than three years.   From these data, we conclude that very few serious 
blunders occurred in the first two rounds of the draft. 
7.  Do teams differ in draft success? 
  Having found that NFL executives were relatively successful in identifying superior 
players, we then investigated whether some organizations had greater success than others.  Over 
the period 1974-2005, teams changed owners, general managers, personnel directors, and 
coaches, so that we can not identify individuals with greater personnel evaluation abilities.  
However, we can determine whether some organizations had superior or inferior drafting 
capabilities.  Our method for evaluating organizational competence in player selection is to 
regress measures of player performance on the rank of the player drafted and a set of dummy 
variables taking on the value 1 if a player is drafted by that team and 0 otherwise.  The Vikings 
are the excluded category.  By including the rank at which a player was drafted, we measure the   23
effect of a team’s ability to spot talent and forecast success given the rank at which it is drafting.  
  Columns 1-3 of Table 5 report the censored regression estimates for quarterbacks for the 
three measures of quarterback performance and columns 4-5 report coefficients for the wide 
receiver measures.   For each of these equations, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the team dummy variables are equal at the 10% level of significance.  This result 
is consistent with that of Spurr (2000), who found no statistically significant difference in teams’ 
ability to select in the baseball draft.   
We also examined whether teams that are successful in drafting quarterbacks are the 
same teams that are successful in drafting wide receivers.  The correlations among the 
coefficients of the team dummy variables in the quarterback equations with those in wide 
receiver equations are small, and none is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.    
Finally, we explored whether teams that were successful in drafting quarterbacks and 
wide receivers were also successful teams as measured by their percentage of games won over  
the 1974-2005 seasons.   Only the correlation of winning percentages with the coefficients for 
the team dummy variables in the years played by the quarterback is above 0.30 and that 
coefficient is barely statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level.    Thus, we 
conclude that (1) teams do not differ in their ability to identify successful wide receivers and 
wide receivers and (2) there is no evidence that teams’ drafting ability (as regards the passing 
game) is correlated with an overall measure of organizational success. 
8.  Conclusion 
  We used a variety of techniques to evaluate football executives’ ability to forecast the   24
relative performance of quarterbacks and wide receivers in the NFL. The analysis was based on 
the order in which players were selected in the NFL Draft and several measures that assessed 
their subsequent performance. We concluded that the NFL executives can, on average, 
effectively rank the future performance of players relative to each other.  However, their ability 
to do so was less than perfect because they sometimes chose players early in the draft when later 
draftees had better subsequent records.  They sometimes also failed to draft players who later 
performed extremely well.   There is no evidence that teams that selected personnel “well” also 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients  between  Draft Rank 
and Performance for Quarterbacks and Wide Receivers, 1974-2005   
      
A.  Quarterbacks 
Sign and Significance Level  Years Played  Rating  Passes 
Positive, not significant at 0.05 level  0 2  0
Negative, not significant at 0.05 level  8 12  10
Negative, significant at 0.05 level  24 18  22
  
                    Mean Value of Coefficient  -.56 -.45  -.60
      
B.  Wide Receivers 
Sign and Significance Level  Years Played  Yards   
Negative, significant at 0.05 level  32 32   
    





Table 2.  Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Proportion of Quarterbacks Surviving to Play T Years 
by Round Drafted 
 Round  Drafted 
Year  (T)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ 
1  1.000 0.970 0.884 0.826 0.865 0.657 0.596 0.316 
2  0.984 0.879 0.814 0.739 0.595 0.457 0.426 0.234 
3  0.951 0.849 0.721 0.630 0.481 0.343 0.307 0.175 
4  0.884 0.788 0.649 0.584 0.453 0.286 0.284 0.163 
5  0.799 0.697 0.499 0.457 0.425 0.229 0.284 0.137 
6  0.725 0.606 0.394 0.355 0.340 0.171 0.255 0.124 
7  0.644 0.542 0.310 0.305 0.283 0.114 0.199 0.103 
8  0.603 0.542 0.282 0.305 0.227 0.114 0.170 0.089 
9  0.561 0.470 0.197 0.305 0.198 0.076 0.142 0.076 
10  0.494 0.362 0.169 0.244 0.198 0.076 0.106 0.048 
11  0.400 0.217 0.141 .0.183  0.113 0.038 0.106 0.041 
12  0.375 0.181 0.113 0.146 0.085 0.038 0.106 0.041 
13  0.275 0.109 0.113 0.146 0.085 0.038 0.106 0.025 
14  0.225 0.109 0.084 0.110 0.085 0.038 0.106 0.017 
15  0.141 0.072 0.056 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.017 
16  0.084 0.036 0.028 0.037     0.106 0.017 
17  0.056 0.036 0.028 0.000     0.106 0.017 
18  0.028 0.036 0.000       0.106 0.000 
19  0.028       0.000   
20  0.028         
21  0.028         






















Table 3.  Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Proportion of Wide Receivers Surviving to Play T Years 
by Round Drafted 
 Round  Drafted 
Year  (T)  1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8+ 
1  1.000 0.956 0.925 0.835 0.686  0.603 0.487 0.343 
2  0.954 0.877 0.833 0.713 0.559  0.405 0.379 0.228 
3  0.935 0.807 0.708 0.617 0.461  0.298 0.279 0.181 
4  0.880 0.772 0.557 0.504 0.333  0.260 0.198 0.140 
5  0.831 0.654 0.504 0.407 0.255  0.212 0.180 0.103 
6  0.757 0.562 0.448 0.305 0.216  0.157 0.144 0.083 
7  0.660 0.478 0.388 0.246 0.156  0.134 0.115 0.067 
8  0.569 0.398 0.313 0.217 0.120  0.094 0.087 0.051 
9  0.496 0.312 0.279 0.158 0.093  0.867 0.043 0.040 
10  0.347 0.243 0.170 0.108 0.067  0.043 0.032 0.027 
11  0.283 0.162 0.131 0.054 0.040  0.017 0.032 0.020 
12  0.216 0.116 0.105 0.027 0.040  0.009 0.032 0.014 
13  0.144 0.081 0.078 0.027 0.013  0.000 0.022 0.014 
14  0.126 0.061 0.047 0.027 0.000    0.022 0.007 
15  0.105 0.061 0.016 0.000     0.000 0.003 
16  0.105 0.061 0.016         0.003 
17  0.063 0.030 0.000         0.000 
18  0.021  0.000         
19  0.021          
20  0.021          
21  0.000          






















Table 4.  Censored  Regression Estimates of Spline Functions Relating Performance to Draft       
Rank, Quarterbacks and Wide Receivers* 
Column:    (1)  (2) (3)   (4)  (5) 
   Quarterbacks    Wide  Receivers 
Variable Ranks  Years Rating Passes Years  Yards

























































































































    
Pseudo-R
2   .07 .04 .02 .08  .02




Table 5.  Percentage Distribution by Draft Round for Top and Bottom Performers among`                         
Quarterbacks and Wide Receivers  
A.  Quarterbacks 
Draft 
Years: 
1974-1999 1974-2002  1974-2005 
Draft 
Round 
All Years  >  10 All  Passes  > 
2516 
All Did  not 
Play 
Played < 3 
years 
1 11.8  33.9  11.7  46.0  12.9  0.0                     1.2 
2 7.4  15.4  7.7  14.0  7.0  0.6  2.0 
3  9.0  9.2  8.9  8.0  9.1  3.0                    4.7 
4 9.7  12.3  9.8  10.0  9.7  4.8  6.7 
5 7.9  10.8  7.9  4.0  7.8  3.0  7.8 
6  6.4                   3.1  7.7  6.0  7.4  7.2  9.0 
7 8.4  4.6  9.1  6.0  9.9  11.4  13.3 
8 39.4  10.8  37.3  6.0  36.2  70.1  55.3 
Number 391  65 429 50  473  167  255 
B.  Wide Receivers   
Draft 
Years: 
1974-1999 1974-2001  1974-2005 
Draft 
Round 
All Years  > 10  All  Yards > 
8129 
All Did  Not 
Play 
Played < 3 
Years 
1 7.8  28.9  8.3  46.0  8.9  0.0  1.0 
2 9.0  21.7  9.1  24.0  9.4  1.1  3.3 
3 9.5  14.4  9.7  8.0  9.9  2.0  5.2 
4 9.8  11.3  9.6  6.0  9.5  4.3  6.6 
5 8.1  5.2  8.3  6.0  8.4  7.2  8.2 
6 10.2  5.2  10.8  2.0  10.8  11.7  13.7 
7 8.7  3.1  8.9  2.0  9.3  13.1  12.2 
8          36.8  10.3  35.3  6.0  33.7  60.5  49.8 




Table 6.  Censored  Regressions Estimates of Team Success in Drafting Quarterbacks and Wide                                 
Receivers* 
Column:  (1)  (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
    Quarterbacks    Wide  Receivers 
Variable: Years  QR  Passes   Years  Yards 
Constant 12.8
a (1.3)  88.69
a (9.90)  2787
a (417)    7.05
a (.57)  3774.1
a  (419) 
Rank -.02
a (.002)    -.19
a (.01)  -6.42
a (.56)    -.021
a (.001)  -12.76
a  (.71) 
Dummy Variables for Teams:           
49ers 1  -5.2
a (1.6)    -22.7 (12.0)  -900 (505)    .21 (.79)  416 (581) 
Bears 2  -3.9 (1.6)    -11.7 (11.9)  -955 (503)    -.17 (.74)   -301 (545) 
Bengals 3  -6.5
a (1.5)  -21.6
a (11.4) -1275
a (482)    -.01 (.75)  12  (552) 
Bills 4  -6.1
a (1.6)  -30.6
b (12.1)  -1255
b (511)    -.36 (.74)  -322 (539) 
Broncos 5  -4.3
a (1.6)  -11.9 (12.6)  -1180
b (529)    -.75 (.74)  -468 (543) 
Browns 6  -6.6
a (1.6)  -19.8
 (12.4) -1269
b (527)    .21 (.74)         -31  (540) 
Buccaneers 7  -4.6
a (1.6)  -21.7
 (12.0)  -695 (506)    -.82 (.76)  -415 (557) 
Cardinals 8  -5.8
a (1.6)  -16.7 (12.4)  -1218
b (523)    -.22 (.75)  188  (544) 
Chargers 9  -4.9
a (1.5)    -9.4 (11.9)  -823 (501)    -.91 (.75)  -596 (549) 
Chiefs 10  -6.9
a (1.6)  -31.9 (12.3)  -1592
a (520)    -1.00  (.72)  -824 (530) 
Colts 11  -3.4
b (1.6)  -15.5 (12.1)   -147 (512)    -.02  (.78)  313 (570) 
Cowboys 12  -3.6
b (1.6)     -1.5 (12.3)  -626 (520)    .35 (.77)  208 (567) 
Dolphins 13  -4.5
a (1.6)  -13.4 (12.1)  -497 (509)    .27 (.77)  264 (566) 
Eagles 14  -4.7
a (1.7)  -14.1 (12.8)  -807 (537)    -1.37 (.81)   -849 (592) 
Falcons 15  -4.6
a (1.6)  -12.3 (12.4)  -530 (525)    -.47 (.74)   -437 (541) 
Giants 16  -4.7
a (1.6)  -8.6 (12.2)  -930 (516)    .41 (.76)  -381 (557) 
Jaguars 17  -2.0 (2.6)  17.1 (19.6)  -792 (815)    -.40 (1.08)       -714  (790) 
Jets 18  -2.6 (1.6)  -1.6 (12.6)  -495 (534)    -.23 (.74)  34  (544) 
Lions 19  -5.3
a (1.6)  -14.0 (132.3)  -1060
b (524)    -.78  (.74)  -482 (540) 
Packers 20  -5.1
a (1.5)  -11.9 (11.5)  -815 (486)    .15  (.73)  160  (534) 
Panthers 21  -5.9
a  (2.1)  -34.6
b (16.7)  -710 (698)    .70 (1.29)  1021 (946)  
 
Patriots 22  -3.0
b (1.6)  5.5 (12.0)  -394
 (506)    .09  (.75)  -88 (547) 
Raiders 23  -4.8 (1.6)    -13.7 (12.3)  -1076
b (522)    .71  (.81)  307  (595) 
Rams 24  -4.3
a (1.5)  -10.6 (11.8)  -926
c (500)    .69  (.73)  562  (537) 
Ravens 25  -6.4
a (1.9)  -13.2 (14.9)  -1202 (632)    1.06 (1.20)  -192 (879) 
Redskins 26  -3.9
b (1.6)    -1.3 (12.1)  -714 (512)    .39
  (.80)          92 (586) 
Saints 27  -5.6
a (1.7)  -11.8 (13.3)  -1029 (563)    -.76  (.74)  -368 (541) 
Seahawks 28  -6.2
a (1.6)  -17.8 (12.5)  -1298
b (531)    -.81  (.81)  -490  (592) 
Steelers 29  -3.5
b (1.6)  -10.1 (12.2)  -851
c (516)    .07  (.72)  -116  (526) 
Texans30 -5.6
b (2.5)  -5.2 (19.0)  -808 (815)    .27 (1.95)  695 (1402) 
Titans31 -5.4
a (1.7)    -21.2(12.9)  -818 (545)    .59  (.71)  166  (519) 
          
Pseudo-R
2  .078 .049 .020   .066  .015 








    
 
 
Appendix A:  Life Table Estimation 
The life tables show the probability that a player taken in a given round survives to play 
at least T years (ST).   The life tables are based on the Kaplan-Meier (or product limit) 
methodology (Kaplan and Meier, 1959; Cleeves, et al, 2001, pp. 89-92).  Players’ careers 
contribute to the calculation of survival probabilities until the time at which they are censored. 
The following illustration for first round quarterbacks shows how the Kaplan-Meyer estimator is 
calculated for the first four years of play for quarterbacks drafted in the first round. 
 
 
Example.  Calculation of the Kaplan-Meier Estimate of the Proportion of Round 1 






























































 61 quarterbacks were drafted in the first round.  The chart shown above lists the number 
of quarterbacks playing for various number of years (column 1), the number who exit the sample 
because they have completed play (column 2), the number who leave the sample because they 
are censored (that is, the number still active in 2008) and who may play additional years (column 
3), and the estimate of the proportion surviving to play T years (column 4).   
 
Of the 61 quarterbacks initially drafted, all play at least one year.  Hence, the proportion 
of those surviving to play one year (S1) equals 1.000.  One player exits football after having 
played leaving 60 players who play at least two years,  Consequently, the proportion surviving to 
play two years (S2) is .984 (= 60/61).   After the second year, another two players leave football, 
leaving 58 who start the third year. The proportion surviving to play at least 3 years ( S3  = .951) 
is product of the proportion playing at least two years (.984) times the proportion progressing 
from year two to year three (.967 = 58/60).   ).   At the end of the third year, 5 players finish their 
careers and 1 player is censored (i.e., is still playing in 2008).
14  That is, one player was drafted 
in 2005 and continued to play through the 2008 season.  This player may continue to play in  
subsequent years.    Of the 57 players still in the sample after year three years, the proportion  
progressing from year three to play year four was  .930 (= 53/57).  The proportion of players 
estimated to survive to play year four (S4) equals .884, which is the product of the proportion 
surviving to play three years (S3 = .951) times the proportion progressing from year three to year 
four (.930).  Note that the experience of censored players contributes to the calculation of 
survival probabilities up until they point they are censored. The implicit assumption is that the 
censored players in subsequent years would have the year-to-year progression probabilities of 
those who remain in the sample.  Consequently, the figure .884 can be interpreted as the 
proportion surviving to play four years in a hypothetical cohort of players who are drafted and 
observed until all complete their careers. 
                                                 
14 Jason Campbell, who played for the Washington Redskins, was drafted in 2005, but 
had played only three years as of 2008, since he threw no passes in 2005. 